The Revenge of Geography

This post is a perhaps a bit outside the norm for an analysis forum--depending, I suppose, on how one defines "discussions in the analysis realm"--but I just finished reading Robert Kaplan's most recent book, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Is About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, and I couldn't resist sharing.  (If the urge to read the full work doesn't consume you, an article length treatment published in Foreign Policy is available here.)

Amazon summarizes the book as building "on the insights, discoveries, and theories of great geographers and geopolitical thinkers of the near and distant past to look back at critical pivots in history and then to look forward at the evolving global scene."  These great geographers and geopolitical thinkers include people to admire (Sir Halford Mackinder whose Democratic Ideals and Reality should be required reading for every policy analyst; Alfred Thayer Mahan; Sir Julian Corbett; Nicholas Spykman, etc.) and some, such as Karl Haushofer, the geopolitician of Nazism, for whom the opposite sentiment will dominate.  This is a fairly long-winded way of saying that the first half of Kaplan's work is very much a book-report regurgitating the ideas of others.  While I happen to prefer reading the primary sources (see the seminal strategic works of Mahan and Corbett, for example, that are available online here and here through the genius of Project Gutenberg) Kaplan's summary is worth reading as an introduction.  With this introduction then in hand...

..the second half of the book then applies the principles of geopolitics to Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, the rest of the Middle East and the former Ottoman Empire, and to the relationship between the United States and Mexico.  It's almost as if the rest of the book is a prelude to the central point Kaplan wishes to make regarding U.S. grand strategy vis-a-vis our "failing" neighbor to the south.  (This last comes with shades of George Friedman's work in The Next 100 Years, and makes one wonder if Kaplan's STRATFOR connection is showing through.)  This discussion addresses the geopolitical motives for each of the regions and states described, illuminates the geopolitical seams along which conflict may concentrate, and makes implicit and explicit suggestions regarding U.S. policy based on these geopolitical discussions.

So, why do I offer all this up?  First, it's refreshing to see the unfairly maligned--and, in my opinion, very powerful--discipline of geopolitics given a hearing, especially from a voice likely to resonate in policy circles.  Second, in the world of force structure analysis (the world in which I was analytically raised) these issues seem to matter a great deal.  Identifying the potential (dare one say likely?) contexts and causes of future conflict matters in determinations of force posture (e.g., the pivot to Asia that we're not supposed to call a pivot), basing, capability requirements, etc., has obvious value in my little world.  These questions can be viewed absent considerations of geopolitics, of course, but the additional rigorous analytic lens these considerations offer seems quite powerful (and multiple lenses is usually best, it seems, to avoid being trapped by our assumptions).

What thinkest thou?

Merf

Nail your whispers to the wall...

So, I've been suffering through Air War College recently (suffering less because of the material and more because of the timelines and integrity-stealing loss of soul to which the associated incentive structure for correspondence PME has driven me), and ran across a nice speech/article from Admiral James Stavridis.

Not so very long ago, ADM Stavridis addressed the Class of 2012 at the National Defense University.  (The remarks he offered that day appeared as a JFQ article titled Read, Think, Write: Keys to 21st Century Leadership; an alternative version appeared as Read, Think, Write, and Publish in the Proceedings of the US Naval Institute.)  The advice he offered that day was simple and encapsulated by three words: read, think, and write.  Stavridis claims,

The quintessential skill of an officer[or, methinks, an analyst] is to bring order out of chaos. You have to be calm, smart, and willing to do the brain work; in the end, 21st-century security is about brain-on-brain warfare. We will succeed not only because we have more resources, or because our values are the best, or because we have the best demographics or geographic advantages—all of those things matter, of course. But in today's turbulent security environment, we will succeed and defeat our enemies by out-thinking them. To do that, and to be successful senior officers, you need to read, think, and write.

He then tells us our "reading should include not only history, politics, diplomacy, economics, and so forth, but also great fiction, books from distant cultures, and perhaps even a little poetry."  (I would add math and science to this list, because that's the kind of guy I am, and I've become a frequenter of several blogs.)  This reading will, one hopes, help us to "think our way to success in incredibly complex scenarios."  This is actually how I use most of my reading in the blog-sphere, to put me on a path to thinking about a particular problem or set me on the trail of suggested related reading.

It is the last of his injunctions, however, that challenged me very directly and led to my inflicting this post on all of you.  Satvridis argues that after we read and think we must write, since "it is essential for communicating what we have learned, as well as allowing others to challenge our views and make them stronger."  (This recalls a favorite quote of mine from Proverbs: "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpens thecountenance of his friend.")  He encourages us to "share our ideas in print--a scholarly journal, a military magazine, or even a blog post." 

I have been remiss in this regard.  I read much, think much (at least I hope it is thought), and write far too little.  Mooch has offered us this forum in which friends may nail their whispers to the wall (borrowing a lovely phrase from the Admiral), and where each may sharpen the countenance of the others.  It's almost as if this blog sprang into being from the tears of Admiral Stavridis.  Be not afraid, but I plan to avail myself of this forum far more in the future.

Merf

The Right Picture is Worth a Thousand Words

Why Visualization?

We often hear a picture is worth a thousand words.  There is a simple reason this is true.  Our eyes evolved to be the best way to put information into our brains (speed and amount).  The amount of information that can be absorbed through our eyes is staggering and only limited by our ability to train ourselves to use our eyes to collect information.

Conversely, if we want to convey information to other people, we should also strive to do so visually.  Hence we must train ourselves to think visually so that we can then figure out how to transmit information visually to our audience.

Here is a short list of rules to help transmit information and concepts visually.  Special thanks to Glenn V and Brian R for assisting me with this list yesterday.

1) A visualization is not simply a picture.  A visualization must be information or a concept conveyed through sight.

2) Pictures that convey no meaning detract from the information being presented and should be eliminated.

3) The most casual observer should understand what's being presented even if they don't understand what's being presented.

4 ) Any process can be visualized...think flow chart, they are simply and easy to draw.

5) Data visualization starts with a simple graph, rarely, if ever, is it a table of data.

6) Data keys are key...never forget to use them.  However, keep simplifying your key until most of the information is embedded in the graphic.  Then you might have the option to eliminate the key altogether.

7) Never try to convey more information then the human brain has the capacity to remember... if it's important to be remembered.

     If the concepts are new they should be in the range of  3  (1st, 2nd, and 3rd law of thermodynamics)
     If the concepts are simple or familiar maybe it's  5 +/-2  (Directorates in your organization)
     If the concepts are extremely familiar or can be grouped, you might get to 7 +/-2 (Football teams)


I run the risk of violating rule number 7 if I go any further.  And it might already be too late...

IBM Has Many Eyes

Glenn gave me permission to post his email along with many of the comments he received.  Glenn wrote:

Last week I attended a series of talks sponsored by WINFORMS and IBM. The speakers were Brenda Deitrich -the leader of IBM's math department (now branded as Business Analytics) - and her lead visualization guy, Stephan Jou. It was exciting to see where IBM's math team has gone, considering that when I graduated I was impressed by the work they did but was unsure about moving there due to industry changes (cf. Bell Labs, Kodak).

But for this discussion, I'd like to think about the visualization ideas. Jou gave a tour through their web site IBM Many Eyes, as well as IBM Many Bills which focuses on depicting US legislation. Tim - what was the web site you were using with lots of visualization techniques? This looked very similar, where the public can upload their own data and try different and creative ways of visualizing their data.


Here are two of the IBM sites for a closer look:

Many Eyes

Many Bills


It got me thinking again about how Tim and Swish provided A8 with an interactive map, and how Brian developed interactive maps and sliders. These techniques are a major change in how we tell the story to decision makers and provide information to the rest of the community. We're used to building or using tools to make maps and other visualizations for ourselves, because we know how valuable they are to analysis. But each time we do, it usually takes a lot of effort, is hard to adapt on the fly (like FalconView), or is not presentable beyond the analyst (STORM w/ OpenMap).

I'm certain there is value in having a warm-base of graphics capability ready to support our analysts and AO's. But how can we get there cost-effectively? IBM sees a profitable market there - they bought the makers of SPSS not for statistics but for business analytics - data manipulation and visualization. Jou cited Leland Wilkinson's classic tome "Grammar of Graphics" about rule-based graphics language. Instead of building an Excel-like library of charts that often falls short (because "there will always be a need to tweak"), they aim to allow users to quickly build their own library with these rules.

Short of licensing IBM's new project when it's built and contracting their specialists, how can we do that? Do we need to keep reinventing the wheel (or settling for what Excel gives us) each time? Is any in-house effort doomed to follow our attempt to bypass Sharepoint with MIS? Is there any open source work that gets us most of the way there, and could we use it on the networks that matter? How much up-front and ongoing effort would be required to make a significant impact on A9, AF, DoD visualization?

I know some of you have pondered down these lines already. What do you think?

Regards,

Glenn

Analytic Foundations

While this blog on Analytic Truth is a philosophical treatment of the subject of finding truth in analysis, a complementary blog has sprung up in which we will treat in much greater depth the foundations of good analysis, namely, the correct application of engineering and mathematical principles. The following is an excerpt from the new Blog.

ANALYTIC FOUNDATIONS...

The purpose of this site is for the analysts ... and friends to keep our analytical spears sharp. We are currently focused on learning Radars.

A small group of us have decided we’ll try to establish lunchtime seminars to learn/review/discuss RADAR and eventually other core competencies. Any/all of you are welcome to join us. Per our discussions today, we plan for our next seven sessions to cover the following topics:

RADAR Range Equation

Parameter Estimation

Waveform Design

Detection Theory

Clutter, Multipath

Key RADAR Components

Electronic Attack/Electronic Protection

TB will send out a few problems or tasks related to the weekly topic NLT the Monday prior to our session, and we will all try to get together on Thursday to share our experiences/challenges/epiphanies. After session 7 we will move onto different topics, intending to work our way through some set of “core knowledge” that our fearless leader would like for us to understand/master. If you don’t manage to complete the task/problems, don’t let that dissuade you from attending on Thursday. The interaction and discussion is most important. The Lincoln Lab lecture series and RADAR tutorial websites below and the Merrill Skolnik Introduction to RADAR Systems text are our core resources, but please share any other materials/links that you find useful.

This is a follow-up to TB’s “Let’s Learn RADAR” proposal: “I propose we go through the first lesson in this course on our own. Then we meet at 1500 next Friday and discuss, break into teams and spend an hour going through relevant problems. As we go through the course, let’s ask questions and create an atmosphere of dialogue .”

TB had asked BT to come up with some questions/problems we could work through in order to help set the first lesson’s material firmly in our minds. We’ll also use this session as a kick-off to discuss how we want to do this in the future. (Many of us have the Skolnik text on our desk, so maybe we work through that with the MIT lectures and materials. Again, anyone who wants to join us is invited.

You can participate in this new activity at http://analytical-foundation.herokuapp.com

The Passion of Analysis

As we continue to struggle with the essence of what makes good analysis and how we labor with uncovering truth by merging the physical disciplines of engineering with the mental curiosity of science and the spontaneous creativity of art we build a passion for our career field. Dr. Henningsen speaks freely about passion within the field of analysis and often dons a red business suit to accent her own “passion” for the subject.

Interestingly a Marine Corps Press publication that hit the streets in 2007 called, “The Passion of Command; The Moral Imperative of Leadership”, by Colonel B. P. McCoy, delves into “Passion” from the stand point of leading soldiers into combat. Whereas the field of operations research should never be construed to approach anything near the life and death circumstances of a combat infantryman, Col McCoy’s instructions in leadership are useful tools across countless professions and other human endeavors. Analogies can be drawn to many of the necessary aspects of combat, like cleaning and firing a weapon, and those analogies are sound. Because, as with repetition and practice and knowing your M-16A2 rifle like the back of your hand, also knowing the tools of your trade, in any trade, so well that their operation becomes second nature does not stretch the analogy and is easy to understand.

To become a professional means to become not just proficient but to move beyond the apprentice and journeyman stage. Becoming a master in your craft is what must be sought. On the battlefield it means the expert and unflinching application of violence against ones adversary. In analysis it means the courage to seek that which is accurate verses that which is favored by political or personal bias. But yes, accuracy does not come easy. Illuminating accurate criteria for choices that must be made by those who are in a position to decide does not come easy. Napoleon’s glance, coup de oeil, cannot be confused with intuition when the matter is complex. Therefore the analyst must become a master a deconstructing the problem and then reconstructing the issues that surround the problem in a way that is logical, consistent, and obeys the laws of physical science.

If it is accurate to say that some soldier as better than others, than it is also accurate to believe that some doctors, some lawyers, some teachers, and some analysts are also better than others. In fact even on the battlefield, unfortunately we must live according to the 3,000 year old law of Heracles which is quoted by McCoy in his book, but is worth repeating for another 3,000 years. “Of every one hundred men in battle ten should not even be there. Eighty are nothing but targets. Nine are the real fighters. We are lucky to have them since they make the battle. Ah, but the one—one is the warrior—and he brings the others home.”

How then to we strive to be the one? Or, at least one of the ten? That, is the essence of what, this blog is all about. This blog may not be perfect…but it is dedicated to those of us who want to do better. But it takes more than dedication, more than education, more than belief. It takes passion. Are you passionate about analysis?

The Whistle Blower

Can we know the truth if we do are jobs competently? Sometimes...but also one big question remains...can we handle the truth? And the truth shall set us free...right? If that were true we wouldn't have to deal with the term, "Whistle Blower". The truth might hurt, it might even cost us our jobs. But we would be free. John Boyd didn't ask for a salary in his post retirement years so he could remain completely independent of bias. Most of us don't have that luxury. But by seeking the truth, we could be labeled a profession of whistle blowers. I've done very little analysis where during the process someone didn't have a little secret or fact they would rather not have surfaced. And that's the dirtiest little secret of all.

Whether we like it our not, we are the ones who have to tell our bosses the bad news. Now, we are not saying that our work cannot produce answers that are not bad news. Indeed our work can produce good news – but that news of marginal value. Those decisions are easy to make. Everyone is on board; this idea is self evident, everyone will make money and every body wins. The analyst is hardly noticed at all. We have referred to this person as the marketer. If you know the truth and sell out, you are a charlatan or worse. If you say nothing, you are a coward. It is the bad news to which everyone takes notice. And there is only one person in the room speaking of the bad news – the analyst.

We can chose to do so quietly or we can chose to tell the media. I would suggest telling your boss first. If your boss shoots the messenger then perhaps you were in the wrong place and you should go tell the media. If you boss hugs you and tells you he will implement all of your recommendations immediately, please call me, I would like to send you my resume. If, what’s more likely to happen occurs, your boss tells you he appreciates your work, thanks you, and sends you back to your office feeling elated and some real job satisfaction that is the best the analyst can hope for.

Unfortunately, in a few days, when you realize that your recommendations have not been implemented, you might not feel as elated and might again feel the gates of AP closing in. What went wrong? You must have been the smartest person in the room and you were bold, man you were bold in there, and at times gusting to arrogant, what happened. Have you been labeled a pariah, a whistle blower? Should you start looking for a new job? Was your analysis debunked? Are their critics out there you don’t know about? Did you do something wrong in your analysis? Are you becoming paranoid and perhaps losing your mind? Do you see the PM walking behind you down the street? What happened? Chances are, you did your job right, exactly right. If you are not upsetting someone you are probably not doing your job. Unfortunately, what happened is leadership. Good or bad, we as analysts don’t make the decisions, they do – and it’s time to fully consider that truth as well.