Know your history ...

A friend who knows my leanings toward math and statistics -- and who understands my professional inclination to read, study, and apply them to military problems -- recently sent me a link to a wonderful article from The Economist, "They also served: How statisticians changed the war, and the war changed statistics."

Aside from the laudatory mention of George Box, whose assertion that "all models are wrong, but some are useful" has done more damage to the profession than any other single statement, this should be essential reading for the members of our smallish profession. Off the top of my head, I can think of at least two other works (other than the marvelous titles already described on this blog as "essential reading" and "books of interest") that should be part of our essential education as military analysts:

The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command by Randall T. Wakelam. Much of our professional identity as a community comes from the mythology of operations (or Operational) Research and its application to the problem of civilizational survival in the Second World War. It seems a good idea to read the actual history of the people, techniques, politics, decisions, and decision makers involved in that history.

Thinking About America's Defense: An Analytical Memoir by Glenn A. Kent, David Ochmanek, Michael Spirtas, and Bruce R. Pirnie. Whether it's the mathematical techniques, the influence of political/historical context on problems of interest, or something more personal, this is an important work for military (especially Air Force) analysts.

There are more, of course. It's hard to tell what the next problem posed to a military analyst will be, so our educations must be necessarily broad. The study of mathematics, statistics, PPBE, doctrine, military history, international relations, leadership, management, theories of innovation, etc., are all important. In this case, though, the question is about the central and defining history of our communal story, our mythology.

What else should we read?

The Analytic Profession in One Tweet

Last week, a blog post by an Army strategist appeared on The Bridge (a marvelous blog that I highly recommend to military professionals of all stripes) that posed the following question:

"How would you define the art and science of our profession in one tweet?"

In this case "our profession" referred to the profession of arms, and the author put forward a compact solution with an attendant explication of his reasons that answered the challenge nicely. There is, I think, more than a little value in an effort like this one, and cutting away the chaff and getting to the heart of who we are, what we do, and why we do it is more than just an interesting intellectual exercise. If done well, it provides a clear and memorable vision that communicates to those on the outside what we do and to those on the inside why and how we do it (whatever "it" might be), in this way creating a professional community centered on the vision. This clarity of vision then has any number of second-order effects on prioritization, training, recruiting, etc., and the effort to create it can pay incredible dividends.

As a member of more than one professional community, though, this line of thinking led me to wonder, "How would you define the art and science of our military analytic profession in one tweet?" I frequently use the phrasing below when discussing the career field among the analysts with whom I work, though I can't claim credit for its composition. Those who know Mike Payne will recognize it and have likely been part of the ongoing conversation that led to it, but the words are his:

"Analysts learn how things work and explain it to others, usually in relation to other things and often quantitatively."

This definition (with 22 characters to spare) captures several critical characteristics of the analytic profession. 

1. It is general. In many cases, we don't have the luxury to consider ourselves as ISR analysts, force structure analysts, operational assessment analysts, etc. Rather, our particular skills will be applied to whatever question is relevant to leadership. 
2. Learning how things work is interesting as a standalone activity, but productive of nothing. Communicating the things we learn to those responsible for making decisions is a critical element of who we are as a community. 
3. Not all analysis is quantitative. There are some tools available to the community of military operations research professionals (mathematical, simulation, etc.) that are in some sense unique, but these are not a sine qua non for analysis. Consider, for example, the analysis given by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their iconic book Essence of Decision. Nary an equation is to be found, but it's difficult to dispute that they are seeking to understand a system and explain it to others who will make decisions. Analysis is something done by analysts, and it is independent of the tools used (except for tool between the analyst's ears). 
4. The systems we study are not isolated, and understanding how they are coupled to other systems is vitally important, both to understand the constraints and restraints imposed by the environment and to illuminate non-proximate effects that may result from changes in the system under investigation. 
5. It's worth noting what this definition does not do. The word "answer" does not appear, for example. Most questions of interest, do not have clean and precise answers, for example, or they have multiple answers that each have merits making them equally palatable but qualitatively different. So, it is generally not possible for analysis of an interesting problem to produce a single, incontrovertibly trues, and perfectly optimal answer. Thus, we explain to senior leaders how the system works to help them better understand the decision space before them, but we rarely provide answers and to chase these chimerae is ... problematic.

That's my 140-character contribution.
Merf

PS ... There's a fairly robust discussion of this question on Facebook among some of the participants in this thread. You can find it here.

The Empire Builder

Most people with problems to solve are in the middle of building something. Sometimes it’s a small empire, sometimes it’s a large one. But it is, in almost every case, an empire. It is, in our country, the capitalist way. The bigger, the better. If you are not growing, you are dying. There are many clichés. Many will confess that they are building an empire, some will deny it vehemently, some will not realize they are even doing it. With very few exceptions, they all are in the process of building. Just to note, there is nothing inherently wrong with empire building and there is nothing inherently wrong with falling into one of the three categories of empire builder, depending on what you do with your empire might have ethical implications but that is not the subject of this blog, that comes later.

This blog is about pursing the truth in order to solve problems. If the empire is the problem it is quite conceivable that the builder will not be able to handle the truth, which might be the case where there is, in fact, something inherently wrong with the empire, but hopefully that is a remote case. More than likely, it is the pursuit of something other than the truth in the blind desire to build the empire that will result in something that is ethically questionable. There will be much more on that case later as well. For now, however, you have just received a phone call because there is a real or perceived problem to be solved and you are the solver of problems, although—professional analyst sounds and looks better on your resume. As you put down the phone you realize it’s almost time to go to work. But first you want to read a little more about empires.

We know the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire, not because we have all read it, but because we know time and time again that history repeats itself. It’s not just that way with Dynasty’s. It is the ubiquitous the cycle of life (sorry Lion King). Everything around us is either growing or dying. Look around you – are you trapped in urban sprawl as your city planners struggle to decide if they should approve yet another tract of housing or strip mall? Is your social group attempting to attract new members and/or seek donations? Is your company trying to land new contracts by pursing business with new clients? Is your boss trying to increase the size of your division? You haven’t been called necessarily to solve any of these problems; you have been called to help a very specific client with a very specific problem.

But your boss did mention that it was an important client whose business was very important to the company. Should you know anything about that client? Should you ask your boss more about the client before you respond? Perhaps you should ask your boss just how important and how long they have been a client? Perhaps you should ask if your boss knows about the problem to be solved. Chances are, you now know everything your boss knows. It is important, as you move forward, however to know from where you came and to where you are going. Why? Because the problem is about to become your problem. And if you are to attempt a solution that allows you to pursue the truth and maintain your integrity you will need to know your level of independence from the issues.

Understanding your level of independence is our second principal for pursuing the truth. And it is why you must know your place in the empire. Almost everyone is inside the empire or nested empires – it is practically impossible to not be connected in some way. Fortunately however, for now it is sufficient to simply understand you’re level of independence as you begin to assess the problem. You must reassess, however, throughout your work, this level of independence. If you don’t know where the lines are, you will no doubt become part of the problem itself and hence part of the solution. The truth will have been lost before you even leave your office.